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Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Plain
Language and the Implied Private Right of
Action Under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5
For nearly three decades, most federal courts implied a
private right of action against aiders and abettors of securities
fraud under section 1qb) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934' and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule
lob-5.' However, applying a plain language analysis, the Supreme Court recently held in Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank3 that this private right of action does not exist, because
section 10(b) does not expressly mention aiding and abetting.
This decision creates an analytical inconsistency, since the
Court continues to recognize a private right of action against
primary section 1qb) violators even though a private right is
not express in the statute. Furthermore, the Court's decision is
contradicted by lower court precedent, legislative intent, and
policy, all of which support a private right of action against aiders and abettors.
This Note argues that the Court's plain language approach,
though appropriate in other contexts: is too restrictive for
interpreting a civil statute created t o provide a broad remedial
scheme. In particular, when applied t o section 10(b), the approach frustrates the statute's intended purpose and if taken to
its logical conclusion would further disarm investors of a potent
antifraud weapon-the implied section 10(b) private right of
action. Central Bank demonstrates the unsuitability of the
Court's approach in interpreting section 10(b).~
Part I1 of this Note briefly discusses the securities acts,
section 10(b), Rule lob-5, and the interpretive case law that
followed. Part I11 outlines the facts in Central Bank and the
Supreme Court's plain language reasoning. Part IV analyzes
15 U.S.C. Q 78j(b) (1988).
17 C.F.R.Q 240.1013-5 (1994).
114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
See infra note 103.
It has been suggested elsewhere that Central Bank may have the positive
causing a realignment of federal powers. See The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 370-71 (1994).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
effect of
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this reasoning in light of statutory precedent, congressional
intent, and policy. Part V examines the potential effects of Central Bank on the defrauded investor, public section 1qb) enforcement, and the implied private right of action for primary
violations of section 10(b). Part VI concludes that the Court's
plain language approach stifles the broad remedial purpose of
section 10(b), and that the Court's ruling in Central Bank is
analytically inconsistent with implying a private right of action, but that the implied private right for primary violations of
section 1qb) is probably secure.

A. Securities Fraud Legislation
The early 1930s marked the beginning of dramatic political
and fiscal change for a nation weary of economic disaster. With
the effects of the 1929 stock market crash still lingering, legThe first of these
islators passed two landmark ena~tments.~
acts, the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),? requires, inter alia,
full disclosure of material information regarding first-time
public offeringss and their registration with the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).g Congress' intent was to deter fraud-a
major contributor t o the 1929 crashlo-and t o promote fair
dealing.l1
The second enactment, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act),12is more "omnibus," affecting all aspects of public
securities trading.13 It was enacted "to provide for the regula-

6. At times, this Note will refer to these enactments together as the "securities ads." For a general discussion of the securities ads, see Milton H. Cohen,
"Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340-66 (1966).
7. 15 U.S.C. $$ 77a-77aa (1988).
8. 15 U.S.C. $ 77j (1988); see a h H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933).
9. 15 U.S.C. $ 77e (1988); see also THOMASLEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
$ 1.2, at 7 (2d ed. 1990). The Securities Exchange Ad of
1934 recognized the Securities and Exchange Commission instead of the FTC as
the administrative and enforcement body for securities regulation. See i+
note
13.
10. See HAZEN, supra note 9, $ 1.2, at 7.
11. See H.R. REP. NO. 85, at 1-5.
12. 15 U.S.C. $5 77a-7811 (1988).
13. See HAZEN, supra note 9, $ 1.2, at 7-8. For example, the 1934 Ad requires companies who list their stock on national securities exchanges to report
material information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 15 U.S.C.
8 78m (1988). See generally HAZEN,supra note 9, $ 1.2, at 8.
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tion of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets . . . , to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such
exchanges and markets, and for other purpose^."'^ In essence,
Congress wanted to bar all manipulative and deceptive conduct
in the securities arena. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act empowers
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish
rules to meet this objective.15
I t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-

....

(b)To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate. in the public interest or for the protection
of investors. l6

In 1942, under the auspices of section 10(b), the SEC
adopted what Professor Thomas Lee Hazen has characterized
as "its most encompassing antifraud prohibition7' in Rule
10b5:17
The SEC was established because Congress felt the FTC would not be able to
handle the new administrative and enforcement burdens being proposed in the
1934 Act. As a result, all reporting is now made to the SEC. Id. at 7-8.
14. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Section 1003) of the [I9341 Act was designed as a
'catchall' anti-fraud provision to enable the [SEC] to handle novel and unforeseen
types of securities fraud," and was intended to "operat[e] even when more specific
laws have no application . . . ." Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities
Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 122, 124 (1993) [hereinafter Securities Hearings] (Prepared Statement of Mark J. Griffm, Securities Division, Department of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT).
15. See 15 U.S.C. $ 78jb); HAZEN, supra note 9, 8 12.1, at 609; see also
B r e ~ a nv. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
A basic philosophy of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is disclosure
and is directed toward the creation and maintenance of a post-issuance
securities market that is free from fraudulent practices. The investor's
protection is the paramount consideration of much of the federal securities
legislation and, in particular, of the 1934 Ad here involved.
Id.
16. 15 U.S.C. 8 78j (1988).
supra note 9, 8 13.2, a t 669. Rule lob-5 is so identified "because
17. WEN,
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I t shall be unlawfbl for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, . . .
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b)To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit t o state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.18

That the SEC intended Rule lob-5 to deter fraudulent acts is
clear from the plain language of the rule; however, neither
section 10(b) nor Rule lob-5 expressly creates a civil remedy.lg
Furthermore, as Hazen observes, "[Nlot much can be gleaned
from the history of [Rule lob-5,] although the courts frequently
refer to the legislative history behind the statute?' Nevertheless, statutory precedent and some historical fragments provide
insight into congressional reasoning and intent regarding section 10(b).

it was the fifth rule" promulgated under 8 lo@). WLLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C.
COFFEE,JR., BUSINESSORGANIZATION
AND FINANCE
155 (5th ed. 1993). It is the
result of an impetuous SEC move to prohibit insiders from using their non-public
knowledge for their personal gain in the securities arena. The SEC heard of a
corporate president who, knowing that the corporation would soon receive a valuable contract, personally visited shareholders and offered to repurchase their
shares. The SEC immediately adopted Rule 10b-5 to prohibit this and similar conduct. Today, its protection extends also to purchasers defrauded by a misstatement
or omission of a material fact with intent to mislead. Id.
18. 17 C.F.R. # 240.1033-5.
19. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
20. WEN,
supra note 9, # 13.2, at 670; see also Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW.891, 922 (1967) (revealing the lack of deliberation on Rule 10b-5). Justice Blackmun cpoted Professor Freeman's remarks in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 US. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. Federal Common Law Regarding Section lo@)
and Rule lob-5
Patterned after section 17(a) of the 1933
Rule lob-5
has become a powerful antifraud vehicle.22Much of this power
results from federal court interpretation finding a private right
of action based on general tort principles. Courts have justified
this expansion on the broad remedial nature of section 10(b).23
Additionally, prior to 1994, federal courts had found an SEC
action and an implied private action against aiders and abettors.
1. The implied section lo@)private right of action

A Pennsylvania federal district court in 1946 was the first
In
court t o find a private action implied under section 10(b).~*
Kardon v. National Gypsum C O . ,two
~ ~ shareholders brought
an action against defendants for fraudulent misrepresentations
and for suppression of information regarding a conspiracy to
induce the shareholders t o sell their company stock for less
than its fair market value.26The district court recognized that
neither section 1qb) nor Rule lob-5 expressly permits an injured investor to bring a civil suit against one who has violated

21. See HAZEN, supra note 9, 8 13.2, a t 669 (noting that 8 17(a) was expanded in Rule lob-5 to cover misstatements and omissions intended to defraud in
c o ~ e c t i o nwith both purchases and sales). Section 17(a) declares:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or
indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of
a material fad or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Securities Ad, ch. 38, tit. I, 8 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. 8 77q(a) (1988)).
22. W E N , supm note 9, 8 13.2, at 669; see, e.g., Cleary v. Perfedune, Inc.,
700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983); B r e ~ a nv. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F.
Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
23. See, e.g., Brennan, 259 F. Supp. a t 680-81.
24. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 513.
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either provision. However, the court relied on the Restatement
of Torts, section 286, to find an implied private right of action:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited
act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable
for an invasion of an interest of another if; [sic] (a) the intent
of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect a n interest of the other a s an individual; and (b) the interest invaded
is one which the enactment is intended to protect. . . .27

The court concluded that "[tlhe disregard of the command of a
statute is a wrongful act and a tort,"28and that "the [private]
right is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that
where it is not expressly denied the intention to withhold it
should appear very clearly and plainly."2g
Other federal courts, including the circuit courts of appeal,
followed the Kardon rea~oning?~
In 1971 the United States
Supreme Court effectually ratified the Kardon result in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.;'
where conspirators used a company's bond assets to purchase
company stock from the sole stockholder. The Court without
analysis recognized "a private right of action . . . implied under $ 10(b).'"~

2. Implied actions against aiders and abettors
Before Kardon and the promulgation of Rule lob-5, in SEC
v. T i m e t r ~ s t ;a~California federal district court recognized an
SEC action to enjoin aiders and abettors under section 10(b)?
Noting that other sections of the 1934 Act provided for an in27. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS§ 286 (1934)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 514. The court further justified its decision by referring to the
maxim ubi jus ibi remedium. Id. at 513. That is, "Where there is a right, there is
a remedy." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
1520 (6th ed. 1990).
30. See, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 @. Mass. 1949).
31. 404 U.S. 6, 7 (1971). Allegedly, conspirators deceived a Board of Directors
into selling the company's bond assets and used the proceeds to purchase stock. Id.
at 7-8 & n.1. However, the company's books indicated that the bond proceeds were
represented by a certificate of deposit. In reality, the conspirators had employed a
deceptive device to secure a loan and used the loan funds to acquire the certificate
of deposit. Id. at 8-9.
32. Id. at 13 n.9.
33. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 118
F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1941).
34. Id. at 43.
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junction against aiders and abettors:'
the Tinetrust court
concluded that "no good reason appears why [section lqb)]
should not apply in an injunctive proceeding to restrain a violation of the [I934 Act]."36 Other courts soon adopted the
Timetrust rea~oning.~'
Twenty-seven years after Timetrust, in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,S8 a United States district
court in Indiana acknowledged an implied private action under
section 1qb) and Rule lob-5 against aiding and abetting a
section 10(b) violation.3gIn Brennan, plaintiffs brought a class
action against an insurance company "for aiding, abetting, and
assisting" an alleged violation of the 1934 Act.40Plaintiffs believed they had purchased the insurance company's stock
through a brokerage firm. Instead of carrying out the transaction, the brokerage firm used the investors' money for speculative purposes and misrepresented the reason that the stock had
not been delivered. The insurance company, though aware of
the brokerage firm's activities, failed to inform the SEC. Plaintiffs alleged that the scheme put the insurance company in an
enhanced position for potential mergers under negotiation and
that the scheme substantially benefited its directors and officers, who sold their company stock during the period of artificial demand?
The court in Brennan examined various cases finding an
SEC action against aiding and abetting a section 1qb) violation
and then addressed legislative history and policy arguments for
implying a private right against the secondary violator^.'^ U1-

35. For example, the criminal statute 18 U.S.C. 0 2 states: "(a) Whoever
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. 4 2
(1988) (amending 18 U.S.C. 0 550 (1940)).
36. Tinetrust, 28 F. Supp. at 43.
37. See, e.g., SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
38. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (memorandum and order denying motion to dismiss aiding and abetting action for, among other reasons, failure to state
a claim). The initial ruling in Brennun was followed by a later decision on the
merits in favor of plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claim. B r e ~ a nv. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), afd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
39. See Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 676.
40. Id. at 675.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 677-80; see i+
part IV.B.1.
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timately, the court based its decision on section 876 of the Restatement of Torts:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious
conduct of another, a person is liable if he

....

(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.*

The court concluded, "In the absence of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, the statute must be flexibly applied so
as to implement its policies and purposes.'* This rationale,
based on tort doctrine and the court's analysis of congressional
intent, became the standard for Brennan's progeny until Central Bank?

A. The Facts
In 1986 and 1988, a Colorado public housing authority
issued bonds to fund public improvements at a private development. Under the bond covenants, landowner assessment
liens valued at 160% of the outstanding bond debt were to be
used as security. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. (Central Bank)
was named the indenture trustee.46
After a 1988 appraisal, the senior underwriter for the 1986
issue contacted Central Bank, questioning compliance with the
160%requirement. Central Bank's in-house appraiser reviewed
the 1988 appraisal and, fearing the underwriter's suspicions

43. RES~ATEMENT
OF TORTS § 876 (1939), quoted in Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at
680. For a discussion questioning the validity of applying tort doctrine to find
secondary liability under $ lo@), see Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under
Section 1W) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 93-94 & n.81
(1981).
44. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680-81.
45. See, e.g., Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975); Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); see also Fischel, supra note 43, at 84-85.
46. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1994).
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might be well-founded, recommended independent review. After
corresponding with the developer, Central Bank decided to
delay review until late 1988, well after the second issue closed.
The public housing authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds before the review was fini~hed.~'
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (First Interstate
Bank) and Jack Naber sued the housing authority, Central
Bank, and others for section 10(b) violations. The allegations
against Central Bank were limited t o aiding and abetting?'
At the district court level, summary judgment was granted for
finding "a genCentral Bank.'g The Tenth Circuit reversed:'
uine issue of material fact as to the s~ienter"~'
and "substantial assistance"52elements. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the question of whether recklessness is
sufficient to prove aider and abettor liability under Rule lob-5.
However, the Supreme Court also directed the parties "first t o
brief and argue the following question: whether there is an
implied private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and SEC Rule lob-5."53

B. The Supreme Court's Reasoning
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held "that a
private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under 8 lo(b)."54In support of its conclusion, the majority set
forth three main arguments. First, within the statute's plain
language, aiding and abetting is not mentioned; hence, a private right of action against it does not exist.55 Second, congressional silence and inaction are inconclusive of legislative
intent? Third, policy is not the overriding issue; rather, the
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
51. Id. at 904.
52. Id.
53. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2927, 2927 (1993)
(granting certiorari).
54. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994). Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Co~or,Scalia, and Thomas.
55. Id. at 1447-48.
56. Id. at 1449-52.
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issue is whether a private cause of action against aiders and
abettors exists under section l q b ) and Rule lob-5.57The following discussion addresses each argument.

1. Plain language of the statute governs
Historically, courts reviewing implied private rights of
action under section 1qb) had focused on the elements that
would establish Rule lob-5 private liabilit~.~'However, in
Central Bank, the Supreme Court scrutinized the "scope of
conduct prohibited by 5 lqb)" and set forth a plain language
approach to statutory interpretation." According t o the majority, when evaluating a statute's scope of liability, a court must
look first at the plain language of the statute." If the meaning of a word or phrase is ambiguous, the court must defer t o
the common meaning, absent legislative history evidencing an
alternative meaning.61 Further clarifying, the Court stated
that "ascertainment of congressional intent with respect t o the

57. Id. at 1453-54.
58. See, e,g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (recognizing "the two
elements . . . for establishing a Rule lob-5 violation: (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure" (citation omitted)); Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding "that the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission is required to establish scienter as an element of a civil enforcement
action to enjoin violations of . § 100s) of the 1934 Act, and Rule lob-5 promulgated under that section of the 1934 Act").
59. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446.
60. Id. at 1446-47.
61. Id. The Court supported its method of analysis with several prior cases.
For example, in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, the Court held that § lo@) did not
reach a breach of a fiduciary duty against minority stockholders absent charges of
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446 (citing Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470 (1977)). It further emphasized, T h e language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct
not involving manipulation or deception." Id. (quoting Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473).
In Chiarella v. United States, the Court found that "the 1934 Ad cannot be
read more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit,"
and clarified that § lo(') is a "catchall" only as to catching fraud. Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980), quoted in Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at
1447.
Additionally, in Ernst & E d v. Hochfelder, the Court rejected the SEC's argument that negligence satisfied Rule lob-5's scienter requirement, concluding that
the SEC's interpretation did not conform to the statute's "commonly accepted
meaning." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198-99 (1976), quoted in
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446.

. .
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scope of liability created by a particular section of the Securities Act must rest primarily on the language of that section.'sZ
In its analysis of section 10(b), the majority found no express mention of aiding and abetting.63 It also rejected the
SEC's argument (presented in an amicus brief) that the "directly or indirectly" language of the statute encompasses aiding
and abetting.64The Court based its rationale on two points:
(1) the traditional doctrine of aiding and abetting "extends
beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed
activity,"g5and (2) other 1934 Act provisions use the "directly
or indirectly" language in a manner that does not include liability for aiding and abetting? In addition, the majority asserted that Congress knows how t o promulgate aiding and abetting
legislation when it wants to do so?? The Court reasoned that
if Congress truly intended t o create aiding and abetting liability, it would have explicitly said so in the statute."
According t o the Court's plain language approach,6' it did
not need t o examine the legislative history, since the Court
found the remaining language to be unambiguous and controlling.?' Nevertheless, the Court examined Respondents' historical arguments and concluded "that Congress likely would not
have attached aiding and abetting liability to 8 10(b) had it
provided a private 5 l q b ) cause of action."?' Relying on its
methodology in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insur-

62. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447 (emphasis added) (quoting Pinter v.
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988)). In Pinter v. DaM, the Court rejected an expansive
definition of the term "seller" as used in 5 12(1) of the 1934 Act. 486 U.S. at 64950. Although tort doctrine recognizes this delinition, the Court held that one must
"look first at the language of [the statute]." Id. at 641.
63. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447.
64. The SEC stated, "[Wle think that when read in context [§ lo@)] is broad
enough to encompass liability for such 'indirect' violations." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 8,
Central Bank (No. 92-854)).
65. Id. (emphasis added). The Court continues by stating that "aiding and
abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities a t
all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do." Id.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 1448 (citations omitted).
68. Id.; cfi Pinter v. Dahl, 486 US. 622, at 650 ("When Congress wished to
create such liability, it had little trouble doing so.").
69. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
70. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448 (stating that "the statute itself resolves
the case").
71. Id. at 1449 (citing Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,
113 S. Ct. 2085, 2091 (1993)).
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a n ~ and
e ~ ~
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug store^,'^ the
Court looked to other express private actions in the securities
acts to see whether any imposed civil liability on aiders and
abettors.74 It found none.75 Accordingly, the Court determined that t o find such liability under section 10(b) and Rule
lob-5 would be inconsistent with the context of the 1934
2. Congressional silence and inaction are inconclusive as to

legislative intent
The majority also addressed Respondents' arguments regarding congressional silence and inaction. Respondents and
the SEC argued "that Congress legislated with an understanding of general principles of tort law, and that aiding and abetting liability was 'well established in both civil and criminal actions by 1934."'77 Therefore, the argument continued, "'Congress intended to include' aiding and abetting liability in the
1934 Act."" The majority rejected this argument, contending
that Congress has never passed a general civil statute prohibiting aiding and abetting, and hence the Court may not merely
presume such a cause of action exists.7g The Court argued
that Congress recognizes liability for aiding and abetting on a
"statute-by-statute" basis, and thus statutory silence is not
equivalent to legislative intent.80
72. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
73. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
74. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448-49.
75. Id. at 1449. However, 18 U.S.C. § 2 imposes criminal liability for aiding
and abetting federal crimes. See infra note 94.
76. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449. In Musick, the Court determined that
"consistency requires [the Court] to adopt a like contribution rule for the right of
action existing under Rule lob-5." 113 S. Ct. at 2091 quoted in Central Bank, 114
S. Ct. at 1449. Likewise, in Blue Chip Stamps, the Court stated, "It would indeed
be anomalous to impute to Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for
a judicially implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable
express causes of action." 421 U.S. at 736, quoted in Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at
1449.
77. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1450 (quoting Brief for Secunties and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 10, Central Bank (No. 92-854)).
78. Id. (quoting Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus
Curiae at 11, Central Bank (No. 92-854)).
79. Id. at 1450-51.
80. Id. at 1451. The majority further argued that because the 1929 Uniform
Sale of Securities Ad created an aiding and abetting cause of action, and because
several states likewise used this language, it is 'hot plausible to interpret the
statutory silence as tantamount to an implicit congressional intent to impose
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In addition, Respondents set forth arguments regarding
congressional ina~tion.~'Quoting from Patterson v. McLean
Credit
the Court replied:
It does not follow . . . that Congress' failure to overturn a
statutory precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it. It
is impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that
eongressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional approval of the [courts'] statutory interpretation. . . . Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute?

The Court conceded that its opinions have treated congressional inaction arguments i n c o n s i ~ t e n t l ~
but
, ~ concluded nonetheless that these arguments "deserve little weight in the interpretive proce~s."~
3. Policy is not the overriding issue

Early in its analysis the Court declared that "[tlhe issue . . . is not whether imposing private civil liability on aiders
and abettors is good
In an amicus brief, the SEC
argued that a private cause of action for aiding and abetting
should be implied because it "deters secondary actors from
contributing to fraudulent activities and ensures that defrauded plaintiffs are made ~ h o l e . ' ~Acknowledging
'
that policy
justifkations exist on both sides, the Court focused on the "certainty and predictability" required in this area of legal analy# l q b ) aiding and abetting liability." Id. a t 1452.
81. Id. at 1449-52. These arguments were substantially similar to those presented in B r e ~ a nv. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.Ind.
1966). See infra part IV.B.1.
82. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
83. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. a t 1453 (first omission and alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S.
at 175 n.1). Note that the holding in Patterson was subsequently superseded by
statute. See Mojica v. G a ~ e t Co.,
t
779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1991), reu'd, 7 F.3d
552 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1643 (1994).
84. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. a t 1453.
85. Id. Likewise, the Court found "oblique references" to 8 10(b) liability for
aiding and abetting in congressional committee reports unpersuasive. Id. at 1452
(citing Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)). Note
that the holding in Betts was subsequently superseded by statute. See EEOC v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 925 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1991).
86. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453 (emphasis added). The Court continued,
explaining that the issue is "whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute." Id.
87. Id. (citing Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 16-17, Central Bank (No. 92-854)).
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sis, and the need to avoid "decisions 'made on an ad hoc bas i ~ . ' " ~I t then presented its own policy arguments against irnplying a section 10(b) private right of action against aiders and
abettors?'
The Court suggested that while a Rule lob-5 extension to
those who aid and abet securities fraud may make the statute
more far-reaching, it does not necessarily serve the statute's
objectives: "Secondary liability for aiders and abettors exacts
costs that may disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency
in the securities market^."'^ Reiterating its argument in Blue
Chip Stamps, the Court stated, "[Llitigation under Rule lob-5
presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in
kind from that which accompanies litigation in general," referring to the excessive costs to secondary actors during even
the pretrial stages of a suit."
Additionally, the Court feared "ripple effects" of secondary
liability under Rule lob-5, believing that professionals are less
willing to give advice to new or small companies in light of
possible securities litigation if the companies go under.g2The
Court speculated that, in such a case, professionals' "increased
costs . . . may be passed on to their client companies" and ultimately t o investors-those whom the statute purports to
prote~t.'~
But as a rule, the Court declared: "Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show
that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result
'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it.'*4

88. Id. at 1454 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)).
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739
(1975)).
92. Id.
93. Id. The Court further states that "it is far from clear that Congress in
1934 would have decided that the statutory purposes would be furthered by the
imposition of private aider and abettor liability." Id.
94. Id. at 1453-54 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 US. 184, 191
(1991)). But see in*
note 186 and accompanying text.
Though not contended by this Note, the Court also found that 18 U.S.C. 3 2, a
statute prohibiting aiding and abetting of a federal crime, does not necessarily
extend to the civil or private context. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454-55 ('We
have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone."). The SEC, however, argued that 18 U.S.C. 6 2 was "significant" and
"very important," and from it the Court may derive a civil remedy. Id. at 1454
(quoting Transcript of Oral Argument 41, 43). The Court feared that to allow such
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The majoritfs focus on whether the action was sustainable
diluted what many thoughtg5-indeed, what the four Supreme
Court dissenters and the parties thoughtg6-were the real issues presented for certiorari: (1) "whether an indenture trustee
could be found liable as an aider and abettor absent a breach of
an indenture agreement or other duty under state law," and (2)
"whether [a trustee] could be liable as an aider and abettor
based only on a showing of re~klessness.~'As the dissent
pointed out, even Central Bank had presumed that a private
right existed under section 10(b)g8against one who aids and
abets.gg However, rather than upholding a wealth of lower

an extension here would logically require "a private right of action . . . for every
provision of the 1934 Ad, for it is a criminal violation to violate any of its provisions." Id. at 1455 (citing 15 U.S.C. Q 78ff). Hence, the Court was unwilling to
"shift . . . settled interpretive principles regarding implied causes of action." Id.
In addition, the Court found the lob-5 reliance element was absent. Id. at
1449-50. Citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the Court stated, "A
plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant's misstatement or omission to recover
under lob-5." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449 (citing Basic Inc., 485 US. at 243).
However, there is a trend to relax the reliance standard as applied to the securities acts. See, e.g., Stahl v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing a private Q 14(a) adion, which also requires reliance, brought by an
investor who had not personally relied on a misstatement or omission); Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1100 (1991) (Rather than "requiring
individualized proof that enough . . . shareholders had relied upon the [defendant's]
misstatements to swing the vote," the Court may find "a causal relationship by
calling the [fraudulent statements] an 'essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction.'" (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 US. 375, 385 (1970)));
Basic Inc., 485 US. at 247 ("Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule lob-5 action.").
95. See Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the 'Central Bank of Denver' Case,
N.Y.LJ., June 16, 1994, at 3.
96. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455, 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at
1455.
97. Id. at 1457.
98. Except when discussing legislative intent and when otherwise indicated,
any reference to Q 10(b) within this Part will imply a reference to Rule lob-5 as
well.
99. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
But instead of simply addressing the questions presented by the parties,
on which the law really was unsettled, the Court sua sponte directed the
parties to address a question on which even the petitioner justifiably
thought the law was settled, and reache[d] out to overturn a most considerable body of precedent.
Id.
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federal court precedent,''' the majority deferred to the reasoning of Professor Daniel R. Fischel in his 1981 arti~le,'~'
Secondary Liability Under Section lo@) of the Securities Act of
1 934.'02
Borrowing from the doctrine of strict c o n s t ~ c t i o n 'and
~~
from recent case law,'04 the Court tailored a plain language
approach. The Court purported to look first at the statutory
language and then, if necessary, at legislative history to resolve
ambiguities as t o the scope of liability, resting its "ascertainment of congressional intent . . . primarily on the language of
that section* of the statute.'05 However, the majority did not
precisely follow this pattern of interpretation; it examined
legislative history not strictly tied to the ambiguous statutory
words and looked to other sections of the securities acts for
further interpretive guidance.lo6
Indeed, the Court should examine legislative history and
policy in spite of its purportedly strict approach.'07 A -plain
language analysis is far too restrictive for interpreting a civil

100. See infra part 1V.A.
101. Central B a d , 114 S. Ct. at 1444.
102. Fischel, supra note 43. Fischel argues that "the theory of secondary liability is no longer viable in light of recent Supreme Court decisions strictly interpreting the federal securities laws. . . . [Lliability for d l defendants must be determined by the language, structure, and legislative history of the relevant statutes."
Id. at 82. However, he also says that "[dleceptive conduct by attorneys and accountants, whether previously analyzed as aiding and abetting or as a direct violation,
should continue to be prohibited by [$ lo&)] and [Rule lob-51, provided the other
elements of liability . . are satisfied." Id. at 108.
103. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445-48 (1994); Karmel, supra note 95, at
3. Strict construction is that method of statutory interpretation that "refuses to
expand the law by implications or equitable considerations, confiding] the law's
operation to cases which are clearly within the letter of the statute as well as
within its spirit or reason." B L A C ~LAW
S DICTIONARY
1422 (6th ed. 1990) (citation
omitted). In modern practice, however, a strict construction argument is typically
accompanied by legislative history and strong policy favoring the result. See, e.g.,
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-37 (1975) (demonstrating this practice). The doctrine of strict construction is commonly applied to rriminal statutes, see Matthews v. Powers, 425 P.2d 479, 482 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967),
although courts have used it in interpreting civil statutes as well. See, e.g., Blue
Chip Stamps, 421 US. at 734-36. However, in the civil context its rigidity can
stifle the effectiveness of a statute with an underlying broad remedial purpose. See
Harvey Gelb, Implied Private Actions Under SEC Rules 14a-9 and lob-5: The ImL. REV.363, 378 (1993).
pact of Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 76
104. See supra notes 61-62.
105. Central B a d , 114 S. Ct. at 1447 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,
653 (1988)).
106. See id. at 144743.
107. See supra note 103.

.
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statute intended to provide a broad remedial scheme. However,
the Court's deviation failed t o go far enough-in examining
congressional intent it gave inadequate credence to the full
historical backdrop, much of which arguably supports finding
secondary liability.'" Furthermore, what little policy the majority addressed1" was speculative and unpersuasive in light
of contrary arguments.'1° Additionally, the Court slighted
long-standing lower court precedent. Although one of these
shortcomings, by itself, may be insufficient t o justify a contrary
ruling, the aggregate makes the Central Bank decision at least
questionable, and demonstrates the Court's struggle t o justify
its conclusions in light of contrary lower court precedent, congressional intent, and policy c~nsiderations.~"

A. Precedent Applying Tort Law Principles to Section
1016) and Rule l o b - 5 Finds a Cause of Action
Against Aiders and Abettors
As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, a large body of
precedent finds aider and abettor liability under section 10(b)
and Rule lob-5.'12 Based on tort law prin~iples,"~eleven
circuit courts had found an implied right of action against aidBefore Central
ing and abetting a section 10(b) ~iolation."~

108. Although the Court briefly addressed some historical elements, such as
congressional inaction, Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449-52, and "oblique references" by committee reports, id. at 1452-53, it dismissed them as "deserv[ing] little
weight in the interpretive process," id. at 1453.
109. See id. at 1453-54; see also supra part III.B.3.
110. See infra part 1V.B-C.
111. For a brief critique of Central Bank on two of these points, see Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1547, 1620-22 (1994), and compare Gelb, supra note 103, at 378 (Commenting
on Virginia Bankshres, Inc. v. Sandberg, Gelb states, "The importance of [deterring] misrepresentations and the weakness of the policy reasons offered for restriction of the implied action, are powerful factors cutting against the Court's
narrow interpretation.").
112. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983)
(applying a close predecessor to the modern test, which relies on tort doctrine);
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D.Ind.
OF TORTS5 876).
1966) (relying on RESTATEMENT
114. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a list including cases from each circuit, see id. at 1456 n.1. The dissent noted that the
D.C. Circuit had "not . . . squarely recognized aiding and abetting in private
8 10(b) actions" in Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), but that the same circuit "ha[d] suggested that such
a claim was available in private actions" in Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824
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Bank, such an action generally required three elements: "(i) the
existence of a primary violation of 5 10(b) or Rule lob-5, (ii) the
defendant's knowledge of (or recklessness as to) that primary
violation, and (iii) 'substantial assistance' of the violation by
the defendant."ll5 The Seventh Circuit also required that the
defendant have committed a primary violation.ll6
Early in its opinion, the majority referred to a "continuing
confusion," due, inter alia, t o the Seventh Circuit's variation
and Fifth Circuit dicta: "There is a powerful argument that . . .
aider and abettor liability should not be enforceable by private
parties pursuing an implied right of action.""' One might
question, however, whether two doubting circuits constitute a
"confusion" of such great magnitude as to justify a review upending nearly thirty years of lower court precedent. Since the
Seventh Circuit's review of the aiding and abetting claim in
Brennan. most circuits have continually found a section 10(b)
private cause of action against aiders and abettors.ll8 Even
though this precedent was never formally approved by the
Supreme Court, the Court had opportunity to review and rule
other~ise."~
Although a denial of review is not approval per
se, it has the effect of downplaying any question as to the existence of the particular cause of action that has progressed
through the lower courts. Accordingly, in the minds of most
F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 n.1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
In addition, the dissent recognized that the Seventh Circuit would only find
liability for aiding and abetting under 6 10(b) if the alleged aider and abettor was
also a primary violator. Id.; see infra note 116.
115. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Cleary,
700 F.2d at 776-77; IIT, An Intl Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir.
1980)).
116. Id. at 1456 n.1. When the Seventh Circuit reviewed Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D.Ind. 1968), affd, 417 F.2d 147
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 989 (1970), in which the district court decided in favor of the merits of plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claim, the Seventh
Circuit's analysis was evidentiary and did not question the lob-5 elements. See
B r e ~ a nv. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). Later, the Seventh Circuit began requiring that
the alleged aider and abettor also have committed a primary violation before a
cause of action for aiding and abetting could be sustained. See Robin v. Arthur
Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. dented, 499 U.S. 923
(1991).
117. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1444 (omission in original) (quoting Akin v.
Q-L Invs., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992)).
118. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Midwestern United Life Ins. Co. v. B r e ~ a n ,397 US. 989
(1970) (denying certiorari).
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federal court judges, a private right against aiding and abetting
clearly existed.'" Justice Stevens commented, "If indeed
there has been 'continuing confusion' concerning the private
right of action against aiders and abettors, that codusion has
not concerned its basic structure, still less its 'existence. ,9121
Moreover, "settled construction of an important federal
statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so
decide^."'^^ The majority acknowledged the lower court precedent and its basis in tort theory only to counter that not all
states clearly recognize aiding and abetting liability in tort?
That point, however, is analytically weak. Lower court precedent has derived a private right of action against aiding and
abetting from general tort law principles, not those recognized
by any one state.'" For several decades most federal courts
have recognized an implied section 10(b)cause of action against
aiding and abetting. The fact that a few states do not recognize
aiding and abetting in tort should have no bearing on federal
precedent concerning federal statutory law, especially when the
statute was created during an era when Congress and the
courts recognized a federal common law.'* Furthermore,
none of the majority's supporting casedz6 "involved a settled
course of lower court pre~edent."'~' In essence, the Court
failed to give adequate credence t o long-standing precedent and
justified this omission with an analytically weak argument.
9

120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
121. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. a t 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
122. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
"The longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress' failure t o reject" it, support retaining a particular judicial ruling. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975).
123. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1450 (citing cases from Maine, P e ~ s y l v a n i a ,
Virginia, and Montana).
124. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.
Ind. 1966).
125. See discussion infra note 144.
126. See supra notes 61-62.
127. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1458 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,
635 n.12 (1988); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 n.11 (1980); Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475-76 11.15 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 191-92 n.7 (1976)).
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B. Congressional Intent Supports Finding an Aiding and
Abetting Action Under Section 10(b)
In its analysis, the Court dismissed s i m c a n t elements of
legislative history that support finding a right of private action
for aiding and abetting under section 10(b).12' Though legislative and administrative history alone should not always be
conclusive of congressional intent, such history should be given
substantial consideration when the Court examines provisions
enacted over a half century earlier. Furthermore, in its analysis of the "directly or indirectly" language,129 the Court
analogized incompatible sections of the securities acts to conclude that such language should not be construed to reach
aiders and abettors.
1. Historical context

"[Tlhe Legislature's failure to reject a consistent judicial or
administrative construction counsels hesitation from a court
asked to invalidate it."lso Justice Stevens points out that
"judges closer t o the times and climate of the 73d Congress
than [the contemporary Court] concluded that holding aiders
and abettors liable was consonant with the 1934 Act's purpose
to strengthen the antifkaud remedies of the common law."131
Indeed, the district court in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Insurance Co. found such liability a 'logical and natural complement to the [implied section 10(b) private right of acti~n]."'A
~ ~brief examination of the legislative intent arguments presented in Brennan helps to establish the historical
context surrounding section 10(b) and Rule lob-5.1SSSpecifically, the Brennan court looked at congressional inaction, commentary, and SEC memoranda. Its reasoning is further supported by the validity of certain legislative assumptions and
the appropriate interpretation of congressional silence.
128. See Centml Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452-53.
129. See id. at 1447-48.
130. Id. at 1458 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1456 (footnote omitted); see d s o B r e ~ a n
v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969) ("A basic philosophy of the [I9341 Act
is . . . directed toward the creation and maintenance of a post-issuance securities
market that is free from fraudulent practices. The investor's protection is the paramount consideration."), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
132. B r e ~ a nv. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680
(N.D. Ind. 1966).
133. For a brief recitation of the facts in Brennan, see supm part II.B.2.
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a. Congressional inaction, cornmentary, and SE C
memoranda. The defendant in Brennan contended that because a proposed amendment to section 1qb) that would have
expressly provided a private remedy against aiders and abettors was never adopted, Congress evidently did not believe the
section would apply to aiders and abettors.'" However, the
Brennan court pointed out that this particular amendment was
packaged with other items and, therefore, dismissal of the
entire package did not conclusively indicate congressional intent regarding the proposed aiding and abetting amendment.'" The court noted that, like the aiding and abetting
proposal, other items in the rejected package already benefited
from judicial recognition but were seeking explicit statutory
expression. The congressional committee, nevertheless, categorically excluded the other proposed items because it deemed
codification unnecessary. '" The Brennan court suggested
that Congress may have declined to ratie the aider and abettor
portion for the same reason.13'
In further addressing this congressional inaction, the court
quoted Justice Jackson, writing for the Supreme Court in an
earlier opinion: 'We draw, therefore, no inference in favor of
either construction of the Act-from the Department's request
for legislative clarification, from the congressional committee's
willingness to consider it, or from Congress' failure to enact
it."lS8The Supreme Court in Central Bank quoted a similar
statement in refuting the Respondents' argument that the
Court should follow statutory precedent unless Congress has
abrogated it: "It is impossible t o assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative
congressional approval of the [courts'] statutory interpreta-

134. Brennan, 259 I?. Supp. at 677.
135. Id. at 677-78. The court also related that in 1960 an aiding and abetting
amendment had passed in the Senate, but that the House never acted upon it. Id.
136. See id. at 678 (construing S. REP. NO. 1757, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1960)).
137. See id. The Brennan court also pointed out that "[alt the time these
amendments were being considered, Congress was convened in special session late
in the summer of a Presidential election year and much proposed legislation fell
victim to a lack of time." Id. at 679-80.
138. Id. at 679 (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47-48
(1950), modi.fied, 339 U.S. 908 (1950)).
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tion."lSg The Court in Central Bank conceded, however, that
its opinions have been inconsistent on this point.140
More persuasive was the Brennan court's finding, based on
a Senate report, that "legislative history does indicate that the
purpose of the unadopted aider and abettor amendments was
'to strengthen and clarify the injunctive power' rather than to
add a new element to the power of the SEC."l4l The court
noted also that General Counsel for the SEC issued a memorandum explaining "that the amendment would 'make
manifest' the responsibility of aiders and abettors,"142 and
"'remove the ambiguity' since 'there may exist some doubt as to
the Commission's authority to obtain an injunction, or impose
administrative sanctions, against persons aiding or abetting
violations of the act."'14s
b. Legislative assumptions. The Brennan court inferred that Congress recognized the SECs injunctive power in
the aiding and abetting context from the fact that Timetrust
and its progeny had already been decided when the clarifying
amendment came before Congress. In fad, courts of that time
"regularly assumed . . . that a statute enacted for the benefit of
a particular class conferred on members of that class the right
to sue violators of that statute."lu For example, immediately

139. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1. (1989)).
140. Id. Hence, the inaction argument seems to fail when, as in Wong Yang
Sung and Patterson, a court seeks a result otherwise denounced by a congressional
inaction argument.
141. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 678 (quoting S. REP.NO. 1757, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1960)).
142. Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 1178-1182 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 276 (1959)).
143. Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 1178-1182Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1959)). The defendant,
however, countered with a second SEC memorandum stating that the New York
Stock Exchange W S E ) desired aiders and abettors of 4 10(b) violations to be subject only to SEC actions. Id. The memo further indicated SEC satisfaction with
such a limitation. The court speculated as to motives behind the memo and the
resulting inconsistency, ultimately stating that neither the [MISEI's intent nor the
SEC's acquiescence necessarily demonstrates congressional intent. Id. at 679. Note,
however, that if the Brennan court were to extend this rationale to its examination
of the h t memo, its assertion based on the first memo would be moot.
144. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In support of
this conclusion, the dissent in Central Bank refers the reader to Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, F e ~ e &
r Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 US. 353, 374-78 (1982). For additional supporting cases, see Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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before the securities acts were passed, the Supreme Court
instructed in Piedmont & Northern Railway Co. v. ICC that "a
broader and more liberal interpretation than that t o be drawn
from mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by Congress" should be used to analyze "remedial legi~lation.""~In
contrast, the modern Court has set forth in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder that one must look to the language's "commonly
accepted meaning."'"
The modern Court's plain language approach differs radically from the Court's interpretive approach in 1934. Since the
73d Congress would have expected the judiciary to interpret its
legislation according to the practice of the judiciary of that
time, the modern Court should follow the then-current interpretive methods if it wishes to be faithful to the original legislation. By applying a plain language analysis, the modern
Court reaches a result opposite of that achieved by earlier
courts and of that likely expected by the enacting Congress.14'
c. Legislative competence and silence. The majority
in Central Bank suggested also that Congress knew how t o
include aiding and abetting in a statutory scheme when it
intended to do so,148and, thus, Congress' silence indicates inHowtent for the statute to reach only primary ~iolators.'~~
ever, using this same rationale, Congress' failure to enact a
statute to abrogate the widespread judicial understanding
could imply that Congress agreed with the rulings recognizing
an aiding and abetting cause of action.'50 Because legislative

Note that Congress passed the securities acts before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that "[tlhere is no federal . . . common law." Id. at
78. Before Erie, Congress assumed that federal courts could create private rights of
action, based on statutes, using a tort analysis. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842).
145. 286 U.S. 299, 311 (1932).
146. 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (citing Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. 322
U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944)); see supra note 61.
147. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1457-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
There is a risk of anachronistic error in applying our current approach to implied
causes of action to a statute enacted when courts commonly read statutes of this
kind broadly to accord with their remedial purposes and regularly approved rights
to sue despite statutory silence." Id. at 1457 (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 1448.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1458 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Court used this argument t o ratify
the Birnbaum doctrine (Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d
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silence may be inconclusive of legislative intent, one should
question whether a plain language approach, which often interprets silence as an expression of intent, is desirable in construing a statute with broad remedial scope.lS1
The weight of legislative history supports a reasonable
inference that Congress approved of aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b).lS2Even though the statute does not
expressly provide for a cause of action against aiders and abettors, there is legislative commentary clearly recognizing such a
right. Furthermore, the statute's broad reference to fraud, the
expansive nature of both the 1934 Act and section 10(b), and
the common practice at the time of enactment of broadly interpreting a remedial statute all combine to support the reasonableness of the interpretation.
2. Statutory language: "directly or indirectly"
Both section l q b ) and Rule lob-5 contain the language, "It
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly" t o commit fraud in the disclosure of, or relating to, securities transact i o n ~ . 'Respondents
~~
and the SEC in Central Bank suggested
that the term "indirectly" could be construed to encompass
aiders and abettors since they are indirect defrauders? Applying Professor Fischel's reasoning,155 the Supreme Court
rejected this argument, deciding that such a finding would be
inconsistent with the use of "directly or indirectly" in other
provisions of the 1934 Act:
15 U.S.C. 5 78g(f)(2)(C) (direct or indirect ownership of
stock); . . . 15 U.S.C. 5 78i(b)(2)-(3)(direct or indirect interest
in put, call, straddle, option or privilege); . . . 15
U.S.C. $ 78m(d)(l) (direct or indirect ownership); . . . 15
U.S.C. 5 78p(a) (direct or indirect ownership); . . . 15
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)) and hold that a plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities to have standing to sue under Rule lob-5. Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733. However, in Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court ignored
many years uf unanimous precedent by the circuits, which had held that the ninemonth exemption for notes was limited to commercial paper. 494 US. 56, 74
(1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, the Court appears to invoke widespread judicial understanding when that understanding supports the Court's conclusion and
ignore it when it does not.
151. See Gelb, supra note 103, at 378; see also supra note 14.
152. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1458 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. 15 U.S.C. 8 78. (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. 9 240.1023-5 (emphasis added).
154. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447.
155. See Fischel, supra note 43, at 94 n.83.
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U.S.C. $ 78t (direct or indirect control of person violating
Act).156

The Court cited these provisions to illustrate its argument that
to the 73d Congress, "indirect violations" did not imply the aiding and abetting of violations.
On its face, the majority's argument would seem to have
merit: Because "numerous provisions of the 1934 Act. . . use
the term ['indirectly'] in a way that does not impose aiding and
abetting liability,"15' its usage in section 10(b) was probably
not intended to impose such liability. The argument would be
stronger, however, if the "numerous provisions" were of a nature that could give rise to liability for aiding and abetting. For
example, three of the cited provisions involve a question of
"direct or indirect" securities ownership,158but liability for
aiding and abetting has no meaning in the context of ownership.'" The other provisions using this language apply the
terms to interests in derivatives and control over a
vi01ator.l~~
None of these contexts would typically support an
aiding and abetting construction because none of them involve
an act that could inherently give rise to the existence of an
aider and abettor?' However, section 10(b) does. Specifically,
its Rule lob-5 prohibits fraudulent acts, misstatements, and
omission^.'^^ In this context, there can be aiders and abettors
to the conduct of a primary violator. Hence, arguably the Court
156. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. a t 1448.
157. Id. at 1447. Consider, however, the language of 18 U.S.C. $ 203): 'Whoever willfully causes an a d to be done which if directly performed hy him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal."
Id. (emphasis added). Although $ 2 is a criminal statute and not a part of the
1934 Act, one should note that the term "directly" in $ 203) is used to describe a
primary violator. Hence, one could logically infer "indirectly" to mean a peripheral
violator in an analogous context. Arguably, however, a private civil action under
$ lo@) is not analogous to a federal criminal action. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct.
at 1455. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. $ 2(a) deems an aider and abettor liable as a
principal for criminal acts without employing the term "indirectly."
158. 15 U.S.C. $ 78g(f)(2)(C) (1988); 15 U.S.C. $ 78m(d)(l) (1988); 15 U.S.C.
$ 78p(a) (1988).
159. How does one aid and abet ownership of property?
160. 15 U.S.C. $ 78i(b)(2)-(3) (1988); 15 U.S.C. $ 78t(a)-(b) (1988).
161. Perhaps the provision addressing direct or indirect control over a primary
violator could give rise to the existence of aider and abettor liability (for example,
aiding and abetting control over a primary violator). However, aiding and abetting
a 8 1003) violation is a reasonably conceivable act, and liability for it is a "logical
and natural complement to the [implied $ 10(b) private right]." B r e ~ a nv. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D.Ind. 1966).
162. 17 C.F.R. 8 240.10b-5.
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analogized incompatible statutes, yielding an unsubstantiated
conclusion. Moreover, in previous years the High Court typically read the language of the securities legislation aimed at
protecting against fraud "not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly t o effectuate its remedial purposes."'"

C. The Policy Justifjing an Implied Private Right of
Action Against Primary Section 1O(b) Violations
Also Justifies an Implied Section l o @ )
Aiding and Abetting Right of Action
The implied private right of action against primary section
l q b ) violators has received much ~riticism.'~
Nevertheless,
when properly supported by the SEC and adjudicated by the
federal courts, the implied section 10(b) private right plays a
valuable role in the securities arena.165The implied private
right primarily serves three functions: deterrence, restitution,
and SEC enforcement support.lB6It deters fraud by judicially
reaching section 10(b)violators. It restores by helping to return
fraudulently lost investment capital to the defrauded investors,
as well as to the market. It supports SEC enforcement by incidentally relieving the SEC of many complaints that would 0th163. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1459 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972)). But cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) ("[Tlhe Court has also
noted that generalized references to the remedial purposes of the securities laws
will not justify reading a provision more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under
the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV.L. REV.963,
969-71 (1994).
165. "[Plroperly circumscribed private rights of action serve as a valuable adjunct to an agency's own enforcement program . . . ." Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L.
Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead a t the Next Decade, 7
YALEJ. ON REG. 149, 183 (1990). "[Plrivate actions have become increasingly important as an enforcement tool in light of the dramatic growth of fraud and corruption in the Nation's capital markets and financial institutions." Securities Hearings, supra note 14, at 124 (Prepared Statement of Mark J. Grifh, Securities
Division, Department of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT). Furthermore, allegations
regarding a current "litigation explosion" due to securities litigation are unsubstantiated. "[Slecurities litigation accounted for less than one percent of all cases filed
in Federal courts in fiscal 1991 . . . ." Id. at 123 (Prepared Statement of Mark J.
Griffin, Securities Division, Department of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT) (footnote
omitted).
166. See Securities Hearings, supm note 14, at 124 (Prepared Statement of
Mark J. Grifth, Securities Division, Department of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT);
id. at 111 (Testimony of William R. McLucas, Diredor, Division of Enforcement,
United States Securities and Exchange Comm.).
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erwise come t o the Commission and further increase its heavy
workload. '67
Professor Joseph A. Grundfest argues, however, that the
private right has several detrimental effects, one of which is
encouraging frivolous private suits.lB8Grundfest asserts that
the SEC rejects cases with a "relatively low probability of success," and that such cases may be among those brought by private p l a i n t B ~ . 'Thus,
~ ~ the partial alleviation of the SEC's
burden may be somewhat illusory. However, even if
Grundfest's observation is valid, such an effect may be beneficial, since the SEC's rejection of a particular case may rest
more upon budgetary constraints in gathering evidence than
upon the merits of the case.170 If so, then the private right
has further justification.
In Central Bank, the majority set aside policy arguments
favoring the private right against aiding and abetting and
focused instead on its own policy rationalein essence, predictability and deterrence of vexatious litigation."' These policy
arguments, however, are inconsistent with the probable effect
of the Court's holding and "are inapposite to SEC enforcement,
because the SEC can clarify the rules of conduct that it enforcLike the
es through the promulgation of regulations . . .
implied private right of action against primary section 10(b)
violations, an implied section 10(b) right of action against aiding and abetting promotes good policies:'" (1) protecting investors by prohibiting all manipulative and deceptive conduct
in the securities arena, (2) providing investors a remedy t o
restore their defrauded funds,'" and (3) relieving the SEC of
167. See infia notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
168. Grundfest, supra note 164, at 969-70.
169. Id.
170. See Securities Hearings, supra note 14, at 113 (Testimony of William R.
McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, United States Securities and Exchange
Comm.).
171. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454; see also discussion supm part
III.B.3.
172. Developments in the Law, supm note 111, at 1621.
173. But cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) ("[Ilf the language of a
provision of the securities laws is sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds
with the legislative history, it is unnecessary 'to examine the additional considerations of policy . . . that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation
of the statute.'" (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33
(1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As previously demonstrated, however,
the language is not clear (see supra part IV.B.2.); thus, policy should be examined
here.
174. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing Brief for Securities and Ex-
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the complaints that could otherwise overwhelm the Commission.17' Most significant are the deterrence and restitution
elements.
Before the Court's decision in Central Bank, aiding and
abetting actions under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 had commonly been brought against professional and service organizations such as accounting firms, law firms, broker-dealer firms,
investment banking firms, and banks. Issuers and other players need the services offered by these entities to enter the marketplace and accomplish securities transactions. As gatekeepers
of the marketplace, these organizations may be influenced by
potential liability as an aider and abettor and thus be deterred
from assisting fraudulent activities of primary players.176In
addition, these gatekeepers are typically solvent and may carry
malpractice or omissions insurance, or both. Primary violators,
however, are typically insolvent.
Thus, an organization
that chooses to assist fraudulent activities would help provide
restitution to defrauded investors who would otherwise have
little or no remedy against primary vi01ators.l~~

change Commission as Amicus Curiae at 16-17, Central Bank (No. 921854)). Because the primary violator is typically insolvent (or nearly insolvent) by the time a
suit is launched, a suit against the solvent aider and abettor can serve to make
the defrauded investor whole. Granted, here an element of unfairness exists toward
an aider and abettor, since he or she might be found financially liable for the
entire fraud. This inequity could be alleviated by altering the liability of a peripheral defendant to proportionate liability instead of joint and several liability. For a
proposed law advocating this position, see S. 1976, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 203
(1994).
175. See infia notes 190-192. Even if Central Bank denies SEC civil enforcement actions against aiding and abetting $ 10(b) violations, complaints addressing
other causes of action (for example, a 3 20(a) action against a control person) may
increase, serving as alternative outlets for investor relief. See i*a
part V.A.
176. See Developments in the Law, supra note 111, at 1621-22; Note that the
gatekeepers might also be liable as primary violators. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct.
at 1455 (referring to Fischel, supra note 43, at 107-08).
177. See John T. Vangel, Note, A Complici&-Doctrine Approach to Section 1Ofi.I
Aiding and Abetting Civil Damages Actions, 89 COLUM.L. REV. 180, 180 (1989)
(citing Harris J. Amhowitz, The Accounting Profession and the Law: The Misunderstood Victim, J. ACCT.,May 1987, at 356, 359).
178. Notice, however, that malpractice premiums and damage awards are at
least partly passed on to clients as a cost of doing business. To more accurately
determine the strength of these policy considerations, a cost-spreading analysis
would seem appropriate. Such an analysis, however, will not be attempted here
since its conclusion would only be tangential to the argument presented herein.
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The ramifications of this decision are somewhat disturbing.
Investors must now look to other alternatives to be made whole
when primary defrauders are insolvent. Although so-called
aiders and abettors may possibly be recharacterized as primary
violators under section 10(b), the difficulty of showing lob-5
primary liability nevertheless decreases the restitution potential of a private suit. Within recent months, the SEC has dismissed numerous cases alleging aiding and abetting under
section 10(b), believing (or at least fearing) that the Central
Bank ruling extends t o SEC enforcement actions.'" Even if
the ruling does not prohibit SEC actions, it places a substantially greater enforcement burden upon the agency. Further, if
the ruling is a trend toward relying solely on the strict statutory wording of section 10(b), one must ask whether it also
threatens the validity of implying a section 1qb) private right
of action.

A. Investor Rights
Although the holding in Central Bank may produce some
desirable effects, such as partially shielding professionals from
frivolous secondary liability suits,lsO defrauded investors
must look to new avenues for restitution from true aiders and
abettors. Options include applying state blue-sky laws, bringing
common law fraud a~tions,'~'arguing an alternative action,
arguing that the aider and abettor is really a primary
violator,1s2or pursuing new federal legislation that, if adopt-

179. See Arthur F. Mathews & W. Hardy Callcott, lightening Securities Laws,
137 N.J. L.J. 1758, 1759 (1994) ("As a result of Central Bank, the SEC has dismissed most of its cases seeking to hold defendants liable as aiders and abetters of
Rule lob-5 violations."). But, for a "hypothetical opinion of some future Supreme
Court" holding that the Centml Bank ruling is limited to private actions, see Simon M. Lorne, Central Bank of Denver v. SEC, 49 BUS. LAW.1467, 1467 (1994).
180. See Alan M. Slobodin, Justices Weigh in on Business, NATL
' LJ., Aug. 15,
1994, at C6, C10 ("[Mlany securities fraud claims against professionals traditionally
have been based on aiding and abetting theories.").
181. Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1761.
182. "Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on
which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator
under lob-5, assuming all- of the requirements for primary liability under Rule
lob-5 are met." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994) (referring to Fischel,
supm note 43, a t 107-08).
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ed, would restore a private right against aiders and
abettors.

B. SEC Enforcemnt
From a public-enforcement standpoint, the result of this
decision may be more serious. If, as the dissent suggested,
Central Bank applies to SEC actions as well as private actions,'" the SEC is likewise left to other means t o establish
secondary liability, or else it must, as it has recently done,
simply let go of alleged aiders and abettors.ls5 This erosion of
enforceability leads t o a "bizarre" result:'86 "The commission
can revoke a broker's license for aiding and abetting a Rule
lob-5 violation, but it cannot obtain an injunction against the
broker for the same conduct."'" Additionally, many aiders
and abettors previously charged and sanctioned will likely
move for removal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(6), which allows relief "from a final judgment, order, or
183. See Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1761. These authors assert,
however, that early legislation is unlikely in light of pressing legislative concerns,
such as welfare, crime, and health reform. Id.
184. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. In 1992, 15% of the SEC's
civil enforcement proceedings were aiding and abetting claims. In an amicus brief,
the SEC stated that to eliminate this "liability would 'sharply diminish the effectiveness of Commission actions.'" Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 n.11 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus
Curiae at 18 n.15, Central Bank (No. 92-854)).
186. Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1759. Consider the majority's own
statement in Central Bank: "Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation
of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to
show that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre'
that Congress could not have intended it. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453-54
(quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)) (emphasis added).
187. Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1759.
[The commission] can obtain a civil money penalty against that broker in
an administrative proceeding, but it cannot seek a civil penalty against
him in federal court. It may (arguably) be able to impose liability . . . for
aiding and abetting in cases of insider trading, where it rarely needs such
a theory, but it cannot use this theory in cases involving fraudulent financial statements, manipulation, or penny-stock fraud, where secondary
liability has been crucial to its enforcement program.
Id. at 1759, 1761 [The text cited is scattered over two pages in the original due to
an apparent publication error; I have indicated the break with the ellipses]. The
dissent in C e n h l Bank also assumed that this decision encompasses SEC actions:
"The majority leaves little doubt that the [I9341 Act does not even permit the
Commission to pursue aiders and abettors in civil enforcement actions under
8 10(b) and Rule lob-5." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(internal reference omitted).
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proceeding for. . . any other reason justifying relief fkom the
operation of the judgment."188
If Central Bank does not extend to SEC actions, as SEC
General Counsel Simon M. Lome argues,18' the agency is still
left with a heavy enforcement burden.lgOAs the Commission
has asserted in the past, it has neither the human resources
nor the financial capital sufficient t o bring aiding and abetting
suits arising from all nonfrivolous complaints received.lgl
Hence, regardless of whether Central Bank extends to SEC
civil enforcement, the agency now faces increased enforcement
challenges that may be remedied only by additional legislation.lg2 Because of the Court's plain language approach, any
188. FED. R. CIV. P. 60&)(6). For a brief discussion on this prediction, see
Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1761 ("Surely an injunction . . . should not
remain in place against conduct the 1934 Act does not . . . reach." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. See Lome, supra note 179, at 1467 (arguing that a five-to-four decision
can only be taken for the explicit holding pertaining to an implied private right of
action against aiders and abettors). Lorne's article presents a "hypothetical opinion
of some future Supreme Court" dealing with the issue. Id. The hypothetical holding, finding that an SEC action against aiding and abetting a $ 1001) violation is
maintainable, is based on "persuasive statutory authority and policy arguments."
Id. at 1477.
190. "Private rights of action have always served as a necessary supplement t o
the Commission's own enforcement program." Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 165, at
293 (1990) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
191. "[Gliven the limited enforcement resources of the Commission, the private
right of action is vital to effective enforcement of Section lo@)." Grundfest, supra
note 164, at 969 (quoting Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus
Curiae In Support of Partial Affirmance at 6, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375 (1983) (Nos. 81-680 & 81-1076)). But see id. at 963, 969-71 (arguing
several disadvantages of implied private rights of action and that the Commission
has the authority to "disimply" them).
192. To merely increase the SEC's budget would not be sufficient. The SEC
needs investors to have a § lo@) private right of action against aiders and abettors available to them. See Securities Hearings, supra note 14, at 113 (Testimony
of William R. McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, United States Securities
and Exchange Comm.). But see Grundfest, supra note 164, at 969-71. Furthermore,
[Tlhe SEC's position fiom the outset has been that Central Bank should
be overturned by Congress. Speaking before the Senate's Securities Subcommittee during a special hearing concerning Central Bank, Chairman
Levitt proclaimed that "[l]egislation expressly providing that the Commission can seek injunctions and other relief against aiders and abettors is
necessary . . . . Legislation to restore aiding and abetting liability in
private action is also necessary in order to preserve the benefits of private actions as a source of deterrence."
John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, What Now for Aider and Abettor Liability?,
N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1994, at 7 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Hearings Concerning the Central Bank of Denver Decision Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d
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resulting legislation will likely be hit and miss, since such
statutes are now to be construed strictly. As the SEC and legislators know, drafting a statute t o encompass the ingenuity of
future peripheral defendants is very difficult. This is one reason why section 10(b) was drafted in such broad remedial
terms: "Section l q b ) of the [I9341 Act was designed as a
'catchall' anti-fraud provision t o enable the [SEC] to handle
novel and unforeseen types of securities fraud . . . ."lg3 In effect, the High Court's plain language approach in Central Bank
has stifled the broad remedial scheme that section 1qb) was
designed t o provide.
C. Future of the Implied Private Right Under Section lo@)
The Central Bank ruling suggests an analytical inconsistency: Although a private cause of action against aiding and
abetting is not sustainable under section l q b ) because the
statute does not expressly mention aiding and abetting, a private cause of action against a primary section 10(b) defrauder
is sustainable even though a private right of action is not expressly mentioned. If the Court is to be consistent, it must
"disi~nply~~
the section l q b ) private right of action. However,
the Court is unlikely to do so since precedent supporting the
implied private right is entrenched even deeper than that supporting an aiding and abetting action under section 10(b).lN
One commentator discusses a potential threat to the implied 1qb) cause of action arising from another source: the
Commission itself. Professor Joseph A. Grundfest's article,
Disimplying Private Rights of Actwn Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commisswn's Authority,lg5argues, inter alia,
that implying private rights has created many adverse effects'% and that the SEC has the authority t o "disimply"
Cong., 2d Sess. FDCH Congressional Testimony at 4, May 12, 1994, avaihble in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News file (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman of
the SEC)).
193. Securities Hearings, supra note 14, at 124 (Prepared Statement of Mark
J. Griffin, Securities Division, Department of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT).
194. For a discussion on the strength of the implied private right, see Pitt &
Shapiro, supra note 165, at 182-83, 293-94 (predicting that implied private rights
of action will increase between 1990 and 2000).
195. Grundfest, supra note 164.
196. Among the criticisms of the implied private right of action are that it is
a mechanism for investors to bling ikivolous civil suits, and that it is a high-stakes
gamble that can result in a class action windfall. See id. at 969-71. See generally
RICHARDA. PoSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSISOF LAW 224-25, 236-39 (4th ed. 1992)
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theme1'' His article is an indication of the current trend
among scholars and in recent case law to narrow the federal
securities laws.1g8If the private right can be administratively
"disimplied," as Professor Grundfest asserts, its stability comes
into que~tion.'~'
Notwithstanding the Court's present tenor of strictly construing securities statutes,zoO the implied private right is
probably secure. Even if the Court or the SEC were to
"disimply" it, Congress would likely create a n express private
right of action under section 10(b). Congress often reacts to
judicial and administrative uprootings that incite contrary
public opinion.201The private right has probably become too
entrenched to simply be swept away without creating significant public and administrative unrest.

The Court's plain language approach stifles the broad remedial purpose of section 10(b). The Supreme Court's message
in Central Bank seems to be that Congress must legislate with
great specificity-broad references to deterring fraud i n the
securities markets will not suffice. However, the Court struggled to justify its conclusions in light of the lower federal court
precedent, historical context, and policy that support a private
action against aiding and abetting. The Court's employment of
a plain language analysis is an effective means of avoiding
judicial overreaching i n statutory interpretation in many con-

(discussing overdeterrence and its implications).
197. See Grundfest, supra note 164, at 976-99.
198. For a discussion of this trend, see Alan R. Bromberg, Aiding and Abetting: Sudden Death and Possible Resurrection, 27 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES
REG.
133 (1994); and see also Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1761-63 (suggesting a "return of a trendn toward "narrowing . . . the federal securities lawsn).
199. But cf. Peloso & Sarnoff, supra note 192, at 7 (quoting as the SEC's
position, "Legislation to restore aiding and abetting liability in private action is
. . . necessary in order to preserve the benefits of private actions as a source of
deterrence.") .
200. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
201. For example, Congress limited the retroactive effect of Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), which adopted a
short statute of limitations for private Rule lob-5 actions. See G.D. v.
Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 783 F. Supp. 1532 (D.N.H. 1992) (noting the abrogation).
The Supreme Court will decide whether this congressional action violates the separation of powers in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., l F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993),
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2161 (June 6, 1994) (No. 93-1121) (The Court heard oral
arguments on November 30, 1994.).
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texts. Nevertheless, it would seem that, when Congress uses
broad legislative construction and clearly sets forth its farreaching intent, the judiciary should feel free to interpret the
statutory language accordingly. Central Bank, however, demonstrates the modem Court's unwillingness to do so with regard
to civil aiding and abetting liability under section 1003).
Furthermore, the ruling is analytically inconsistent with
the implied private right of action under section 10(b),since the
plain language of the statute does not create a private right of
action. However, the implied section 10(b) private right is probably not in danger of extinction, since it has been deeply entrenched by decades of precedent. Even if the Court or the SEC
were to "disimply" it, Congress would likely legislate an express private right of action against section 10(b) violators to
effectuate the remedial intent underlying the 1934 Act.

T. James Lee, Jr.

